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FOREIGN CORRUPTION AS MARKET MANIPULATION
by Gina-Gail S. Fletcher

Introduction
On March 6, 2019, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) announced that it would be taking an active role in prosecuting violations of
the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA) that involve foreign corruption.ill On the
same date, the CFTC published an enforcement advisory further signaling its
intention to investigate and prosecute violations of the laws and regulations of the
CEA linked to foreign corrupt practices, such as violations of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA). The FCPA prohibits US-based businesses from engaging in
corrupt practices, such as bribery, in foreign countries in which they do business.
Currently, both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) vigorously and vigilantly enforce the FCPA. How and to what
extent, therefore, would the involvement of the CFTC impact the prosecution of
FCPA violations?
This Essay explores this question by focusing on two specific inquiries. First, this
Essay examines what kinds of foreign corrupt practices could overlap with the
CFTC's jurisdiction. The CFTC is the exclusive regulator of the derivatives and
commodities market, and one of its primary concerns is to deter and detect market
manipulation. In turning its focus to foreign corrupt practices that violate the CEA,
one implication is that there is a connection between foreign corruption and
manipulation of the US derivatives and commodities markets. Exploring how
foreign corruption can manifest into market manipulation, therefore, is important
to understanding the potential types of conduct that may warrant CFTC attention.
Second, this Essay assesses the implications of the CFTC's foray into the
prosecution of foreign corruption. For example, with the addition of another
regulator to the FCPA's enforcement roster, derivatives and commodities market
participants likely face FCPA-related compliance requirements that they did not
previously have.
Part I of this Essay begins with an overview of the FCPA. It describes the purpose
of the FCPA and the enforcement approach of the DOJ and SEC in relation to the
Act. Part I also summarizes the CFTC's role in the financial markets and its
traditional jurisdictional scope. Part II examines three potential scenarios in which
foreign corruption could result in manipulation of the US derivatives and
commodities markets. Part III considers the implications of the CFTC's involvement
in the enforcement of the FCPA and, lastly, raises additional questions that may
prove fruitful for future research.
I. Overview of the FCPA and the CFTC
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A. The FCPA
The FCPA was enacted in the wake of bribery scandals involving major US
companies abroad. Originally passed in 1977, the FCPA was the first statute to
outlaw bribery of foreign officials, significantly expanding the extraterritorial reach
of US laws. Specifically, the FCPA prohibits giving or offering anything of value to a
foreign official for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business. Covered under the
FCPA's provisions are (i) issuers registered with or required to file reports with the
SEC; (ii) "domestic concerns," which includes any citizen, national, or resident of the
US, any US-based business, and any director, officer, or agent of such an entity; and
(iii) any person or entity that engages in acts in furtherance of bribery while in the
US
While the anti-bribery provisions are the heart of the FCPA, it also imposes
accounting and internal control provisions on publicly traded companies. Companies
with securities traded on national exchanges are required to "make and keep books,
records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the
transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer." To comply with the
internal control provisions, issuers must implement and maintain an internal
system of controls designed to provide reasonable assurances that there are no
unauthorized transactions and improper payments.
Individuals prosecuted for violations of the FCPA may face both civil and criminal
liability. On the civil side, defendants face fines of up to $10,000 per violation.
Defendant corporations may receive criminal penalties of up $2 million for
violations of the anti-bribery provisions and $25 million for the accounting
provisions. Individual defendants can face potential criminal penalties of $100,000
and up to five years of imprisonment for paying bribes, and up to twenty years of
imprisonment for running afoul of the accounting requirements. In addition to these
statutorily mandated penalties, companies also face additional fines, disgorgement
of profits earned through corruption, and potential debarment from contracting
with the US government. Furthermore, although the FCPA does not create a
private right of action, companies may face shareholder derivative suits and federal
securities claims related to FCPA violations.
Both the DOJ and the SEC are responsible for enforcing the FCPA, but only the
DOJ may bring criminal charges against defendants. Prior to the 2000s, the FCPA
was enforced sporadically and fines rarely exceeded $1,000,000 when imposed.
However, the trend has decidedly changed, with both the DOJ and SEC declaring
enforcement of the FCPA to be a high priority. Since the early 2000s, the number of
FCPA enforcement actions has increased significantlv in size, moving from an
average of three enforcement actions per year pre-2000 to an average of
approximately twenty-eight actions per year between 2008 and 2017. Likewise,
monetary penalties associated with FCPA violations have increased greatly, going
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from a yearly average of $4.3 million between 1977 and 1997 to a $37 million
annual average between 2008 and 2017.
Although there is no consensus as to why the DOJ and SEC have focused their
attentions on FCPA violations, the increased enforcement has a significant impact
on how multinational firms conduct their businesses. As one scholar has noted, in
light of the extremely large penalties and collateral consequences that may flow
from an FCPA enforcement action, companies possess a "rational level of fear" of
running afoul of the statute. To proactively minimize potential violations of the
FCPA, multinational corporations have spent considerable resources designing and
implementing compliance programs intended to identify and root out potential
sources of FCPA liability. Further, institution of an enforcement action can result in
significant, ongoing financial liability for firms, including costs related to
undertaking internal investigations; employing independent consultants to oversee
and report on the company's remediation efforts; and addressing civil liability
stemming from their violations, among other costs. Thus, the FCPA imposes
substantial costs on firms that fall within the statute's ambit, even in the absence of
an actual violation.
B. The CFTC-Purview & Purpose
The CFTC is one of the two primary regulators of the financial markets in the US.
Established in 1974, the CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over commodities and
derivatives, such as futures, swaps, and options. Originally tasked with
regulating futures on agricultural products, the jurisdictional scope of the CFTC
has expanded significantly since its inception to include energy, foreign exchange,
interest rates, credit default swaps, and, most recently, digital currencies. Anyone
that trades commodity derivatives must register with the National Futures
Association-the self-regulatory organization responsible for regulating the futures
market-and must trade on a futures exchange. The CFTC has regulatory authority
over the NFA and futures exchanges, which grants the agency indirect regulatory
authority over futures traders.
A primary regulatory focus of the CFTC is to identify and punish instances of fraud
and manipulation involving derivatives and commodities, thereby ensuring the
efficiency and integrity of the markets. The Commodities Exchange Act (CEA)
grants the CFTC broad authority to bring civil enforcement actions for price
manipulation, fraud-based manipulation, and insider trading, for example. In
recent years, the CFTC has increased its anti-manipulation efforts, formed a task
force aimed at spoofing, brought a greater number of manipulation-related
enforcement actions, and levied significantly higher fines for market abuse. With
these efforts, the CFTC has signaled its intention to increase its profile as a
significant regulator and enforcer in the financial markets. The agency's focus on
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the FCPA, therefore, can be viewed as part of its larger push to be a more active
regulator within the financial markets, alongside the DOJ and SEC.
In March 2019, the CFTC issued an enforcement advisory 0 to encourage companies
and individuals to self-report violations of the CEA that implicate foreign
corruption. According to the Advisory, market actors that self-report may be
entitled to significant reductions in civil penalties. For actors not registered with
the CFTC, there will be a presumption of no civil penalty. Registered actors,
however, already have an obligation to report to the CFTC and, as such, will not be
entitled to this presumption. But, as the Advisory states, registrants that selfreport, cooperate with the CFTC, and remediate their violations may receive a
substantial reduction in their penalties. Notably, the CFTC's Advisory closely
mirrors the DOJ's FCPA guidance regarding voluntary self-reporting, cooperation,
and timely remediation.
The CFTC, therefore, intends to work closely with the DOJ (and SEC) but will focus
exclusively on prosecuting violations of the CEA and CFTC's rules and regulations
that involve foreign corruption in the markets the CFTC regulates. Given the
CFTC's broad jurisdictional authority to prevent and prosecute market abuse in the
derivatives and commodities markets, the CFTC's entry into the overlapping space
between the CEA and the FCPA is, arguably, within the agency's regulatory scope.
Yet, this has not traditionally been an area of focus for the CFTC and, as such, it is
necessary to consider when and how foreign corruption may result in manipulation
of the US commodities and derivatives markets or otherwise violate the CEA. In
Part II of this Essay, I analyze three potential theories of when and how the CEA
and FCPA may intersect.
II. Foreign Corruption as Manipulation-Examining the Possibilities
The CFTC's interest in and focus on preventing market manipulation has increased
significantly in the past decade. Since 2010, the number of market manipulation
cases filed by the CFTC has increased from a single case in 2010 to over twenty-six
such cases in 2018. Prior to 2018, the single-year high for manipulation cases
brought by the CFTC was 2017, when the agency filed twelve cases. Indeed, fraud
and market manipulation accounted for fifty-six of the CFTC's total eighty-three
enforcement actions for 2018. Thus, the CFTC's decision to focus its attention on
foreign corrupt practices that implicate market manipulation and fraud in US
commodities markets is in line with its ongoing and increasing emphasis on
minimizing and eliminating conduct that undermines the integrity of the
commodities and derivatives markets.
As stated above, the CFTC's foray into enforcement of foreign corruption is new
and, as a result, there are no actual examples of the intersection of the CEA and
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FCPA. Nonetheless, this Part explores three instances in which FCPA violations
may arise within the CFTC's jurisdictional scope: if bribes or corrupt conduct are
used (i) to secure commodities- or derivatives-related business; (ii) to corner or
squeeze a commodity; or (iii) to manipulate benchmarks used to price derivatives.
A. Securing Business
An obvious intersection of the CEA and FCPA would involve the use of bribes or
other corrupt conduct to secure derivatives- or commodities-related business. For
example, if a hedge fund bribes a foreign official with authority over a sovereign
wealth fund to secure it as an investor in a derivative transaction, such conduct
could potentially constitute a violation of the CEA involving foreign corrupt
practices. The CEA violation, however, would not be related to market
manipulation. Rather, the CEA violation would likely arise from reporting failures
or fraudulent reporting of these payments. The hedge fund's bribe could violate the
CEA in two ways. First, the use of investor funds to pay bribes, rather than to
invest in commodity transactions, would constitute fraud under the CEA. Indeed, if
the true nature of the illegal payments is not disclosed or the payments
are misrepresented to the investors of the hedge fund, such conduct would plainly
violate the CEA. Second, and relatedly, registered market participants such as
commodity pool operators-which includes many hedge funds-are required to keep
detailed and accurate accounting records of their expenditures. If the bribes are
mischaracterized as ordinary business expenses, the CFTC could charge the
commodity pool operator with recordkeeping violations.
Precedent exists for this possibility. In 2016, the DOJ and SEC
brought charges against Och-Ziff, one of the world's largest hedge funds, for FCPA
violations relating to payments to Libyan officials. Och-Ziff allegedly paid bribes to
Libyan officials, using investor funds, to help win mining rights for a joint venture
in which it was involved. Additionally, Och-Ziff paid bribes to induce investment
from the Libya's sovereign wealth fund into Och-Ziffs managed funds. The SEC
charged Och-Ziff with fraud for misleading investors on the use of their funds and
with recordkeeping violations for recording these illegal payments as business
expenses. In settling the case, Och-Ziff (i) agreed to pay the DOJ and SEC $412
million for criminal and civil violations, (ii) entered into a three-year deferred
prosecution agreement, and (iii) was required to retain a compliance monitor for
three years.
It is not difficult to see that, with slight changes, similar facts could implicate the
CEA. For example, if Och-Ziff transacted in derivatives, rather than equities, the
very same conduct could bring it under the regulatory purview of a CFTC
enforcement action based on its foreign misconduct. Notably, however, the conduct
described would be subject to an enforcement action by the DOJ, nonetheless. Thus,
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while this is an area in which the CEA and FCPA intersect, it is questionable
whether the CFTC's involvement meaningfully enhances enforcement of the FCPA.
B. Corners & Squeezes
Another possible overlap between the CEA and FCPA would arise if market actors
employ foreign corrupt practices to "corner" or "squeeze" the market for a
commodity. A corner is a distortive practice in commodities markets whereby a
trader establishes a dominant position in a commodity and is able to force all others
in the market to transact with her at monopolistic prices. Whereas a corner is
complete domination of the market, a squeeze is less absolute and less extreme in
its effect. These types of transactions are deemed manipulative because they result
in artificial prices for the affected commodity. The "unnatural" shortage of the
commodity causes the price to be artificially inflated, thereby allowing the bad actor
to profit from cornering or squeezing the market.
A corner or squeeze could implicate the FCPA if a market actor bribed a foreign
government official to restrict its country's supply of a commodity for which it was a
primary producer. If such a bribe was paid in order to impact the price of the
commodity, the bribe could constitute a violation of both the FCPA and CEA. For
example, let us suppose Prime Copper Refinery ("Refinery") processes copper mined
in the country of "Mineralia," one of the top global producers of copper. Mineralia
recently discovered a new ore deposit of copper and is considering whether to
expand its mining operations. Refinery's profitability would decrease if Mineralia
begins mining copper from this new deposit and, therefore, it would benefit if
Mineralia delayed any new mining plans. To influence Mineralia's decision,
Refinery makes payments to officials in Mineralia's government who have influence
and decision-making authority over the country's decision to mine. Let us suppose
further that, as a result of Mineralia's decision to forgo mining, the world's supply of
copper is significantly reduced, making Refinery one of the few suppliers of copper
globally. As described above, Refinery, in collusion with Mineralia's government
officials, has squeezed the copper market, artificially inflating the price of copper
and derivatives related to copper. Under this scenario, the CFTC would likely have
grounds to prosecute Refinery for price manipulation, attempted price
manipulation, and use of a manipulative device or scheme.
Other variations on these facts are possible, but in essence, this example is
premised on a company paying a bribe to gain monopolistic or near-monopolistic
control over a given commodity market. Although no such example is currently
available, recent FCPA enforcement actions involving commodities production have
included a Chilean metals mining company, gold Mining in Ghana, and a Brazilian
state-owned oil company. To the extent any of these FCPA violations had an effect
on US commodities prices, the CFTC could hold these market actors liable for
market manipulation for their intentionally manipulative conduct. In these cases, it
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is arguable that the CFTC's involvement may add something to the DOJ's and
SEC's enforcement if it is prosecuting conduct that negatively affects US
commodities prices. However, given the long-standing difficulty the CFTC has faced
in successfully proving market manipulation domestically, one must ask whether
the agency's expansion into international market manipulation will fare better.
C. Benchmark Manipulation
A third possibility lies in foreign corrupt practices being employed to influence or
taint a benchmark used to price or value derivative instruments. A benchmark is
the aggregation of multiple sources of market information into a single metricsuch as a price, rate, or index-that is used as the basis for valuing derivatives. For
example, an interest rate option may be valued by reference to an interest rate
benchmark that aggregates and synthesizes interest rates from other financial
institutions into a single, market-representative number. Benchmarks are
ubiquitous in the derivatives markets because they facilitate ease of pricing, provide
a wealth of information on market conditions, and improve market liquidity by
standardizing pricing across derivatives. Typically, independent third parties
aggregate market inputs and produce benchmarks based on proprietary
methodologies. Thus, the utility of the benchmark is directly connected to the
reliability and breadth of the inputs that form the end result.
Benchmarks could implicate both the FCPA and CEA if a foreign official responsible
for contributing data used in compiling a benchmark was bribed to falsify her
country's contributed data to the benchmark. For example, suppose the price per
barrel that "Oilzealand" charges for its oil is a key input for a crude oil benchmark
and reflects the median price of major state-based oil production globally (the "Oil
Benchmark"). Suppose further that a hedge fund has large options contracts
expiring in a few days, all of which reference the Oil Benchmark, and, if the Oil
Benchmark trends higher, the hedge fund will lose substantial sums. To prevent
these losses, the hedge fund bribes government officials in Oilzealand to lower the
price inputs submitted to the Oil Benchmark. Oilzealand's false inputs sufficiently
lower the Oil Benchmark, thereby allowing the hedge fund to profit on its options
contracts.
This scenario represents another intersection of the FCPA and CEA that has
related precedent in the market. In 2012, it was uncovered that the London
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)-the leading interest rate benchmark-was being
systematically manipulated by banks responsible for submitting the inputs on
which it was based. At the time of its manipulation, LIBOR was calculated from the
submissions of leading banks. After elimination of the highest and lowest
submissions, the rate was calculated as an average of the remaining submissions.
Traders at the banks, however, would falsify their submissions to LIBOR based on
whether they needed the rate to increase or decrease to ensure the profitability of
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their outstanding derivatives. For their role in the LIBOR manipulation schemes,
the CFTC fined participating banks billions of dollars for violations of the CEA.
Such a scenario could also violate the FCPA if the benchmark's inputs were
manipulated owing to bribery of a foreign official. Numerous benchmarks for
physical commodities rely on inputs from state-owned commodities producers.
Bribes paid to manipulate benchmarks referenced by derivative contracts within
the CFTC's regulatory ambit, therefore, could implicate both the CEA and FCPA.
III. Implications and Additional Questions
The potential scenarios discussed above are neither far-fetched nor complete.
Rather, they are possible intersections between the CEA and foreign corruption that
would fall within the CFTC's regulatory purview. Indeed, such scenarios are not
purely hypothetical. It was recently revealed that Glencore Plc, one of the largest
commodity traders in the world, was under investigation by the CFTC for possible
corrupt practices that violated the CEA. The CFTC's expected active engagement in
the area raises certain questions for the future of FCPA enforcement and
interagency cooperation and coordination in this space.
First, what does the CFTC's involvement add to the global fight against foreign
corrupt practices? An immediate critique of the CFTC's focus on foreign corruption
is that it adds yet another regulator to an area in which there are already two
overseers domestically, not to mention numerous others globally. Arguably, to the
extent foreign corruption affects the US commodities markets, such misconduct
ought to be captured under the FCPA's broad grant of authority to the DOJ and the
SEC. Additionally, the CFTC has indicated its intent not to "pile on" and initiate
investigations or enforcement actions that duplicate the efforts of the DOJ and
SEC. Indeed, the CFTC's Advisory aligns with the policies and practices of the DOJ,
further supporting the CFTC's stated intentions not to conflict with or duplicate the
efforts of other enforcement agencies. At a minimum, the CFTC's foray into anticorruption enforcement does not appear to be inefficient; rather, the agencies seem
intent on engaging in collaborative enforcement. Yet this does not quite answer the
question of what this new agency adds to global anti-corruption efforts that is not
already covered by the DOJ's and SEC's jurisdictional authority under the FCPA.
Most obviously, the CFTC adds expertise on the workings of the commodities and
derivatives markets, in addition to a deeper understanding of how market
manipulation works in these markets. As the focus of foreign corruption
enforcement actions hones in on commodities traders, the CFTC is able to lend
expertise to the other enforcement agencies in untangling undoubtedly complex
schemes that may distort commodities markets. Additionally, although the CFTC
lacks the authority to bring actions under the FCPA, it can complement the DOJ's
and SEC's actions by pursuing foreign corrupt practices that violate the CEA but
may not have been fully addressed under other enforcement actions. For example,
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the CFTC is not limited to bringing enforcement proceedings against public issuers
or registrants. Rather, the CFTC's authority to prosecute foreign corrupt practices
that violate the CEA extends to non-issuers, which is beyond the SEC's jurisdiction.
Notably, the CFTC is also able to bring enforcement actions against individuals and
entities not required to register under the CEA. Thus, jurisdictionally, the CFTC
fills a gap where there is DOJ authority to bring criminal proceedings but there
may not be a civil regulator with authority.
Second, how will courts and the markets respond to the CFTC's extraterritorial
extension of the CEA's anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions? The expanded
the CFTC's extraterritorial jurisdiction to include activities that have a "direct and
significant . . . effect on commerce of the United States." The CFTC has relied on

this authority to implement cross-border regulation over aspects of the derivatives
markets that it considers to be systemically important, such as the regulation of
margin, clearing, and dealer capital. To date, the CEA's manipulation and fraud
provisions have not been extended extraterritorially and, therefore, it remains to be
seen how courts will respond. Indeed, if the CFTC's basis for extraterritorial
jurisdiction is systemic risk, then it raises the question of whether foreign corrupt
practices that manipulate the markets rise to the level of systemic risk. And, if not,
then does the CFTC have a statutorily sound basis on which to extend the
application of the CEA's manipulation and fraud provisions to reach foreign corrupt
practices?
Relatedly, how will the CFTC fare in holding firms and traders accountable for
manipulation for foreign conduct given their historical difficulties in holding actors
liable domestically? Proving market manipulation has been somewhat hard for the
CFTC in the past, with the agency winning its first manipulation case in court in
2009. The Dodd-Frank Act expanded the agency's manipulation authority, granting
it powers similar to those of the SEC and allowing the agency to address fraudbased manipulation in the commodities and derivatives markets. In the decade
since its powers have been broadened, the CFTC has become more active in its antimanipulation enforcement actions and more aggressive in its interpretation of its
statutory authority. Thus, as the agency expands to include foreign conduct among
its manipulation enforcement actions, it will be worthwhile to note how the CFTC
charges foreign corruption under the CEA; how courts respond to these actions; and
whether or to what extent foreign-based actions have an impact on the CFTC's
future strategies in domestic manipulation cases.
Lastly, what are the practical implications for firms' compliance programs now that
the CFTC is part of the FCPA regulatory landscape? With the addition of the CFTC
to the regulatory roster, firms that operate at the intersection of the CEA and FCPA
ought to reevaluate their compliance programs and internal controls to assess and
identify potential sources of exposure. Companies should expect that the CFTC will
be closely examining their conduct in the commodities and derivatives markets,
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including that of their traders and agents irrespective of their registration status
with the CFTC. Yet, given the newness of the CFTC's interest in foreign bribery,
firms may struggle with identifying the aspects of their operations that may draw
scrutiny from the CFTC but are commonplace in the industry. For example, the use
of middlemen to negotiate deals in resource-rich countries is a common practice in
the world of commodities trading but may expose firms to unwanted scrutiny from
the CFTC.
Firms must now include the CFTC in their calculus when deciding to self-report
and assessing the extent of their potential liability for foreign corrupt practices. A
key feature of the CFTC's enforcement policy encourages market participants to
voluntarily self-report violations of the CEA to receive a substantial reduction in
civil penalties. For conduct that violates the CEA and FCPA, firms must now
consider the potential scope of their liability under two statutes, whether their
FCPA violations give rise to potential liability under the CEA, and the timing of
when to disclose to the DOJ, SEC, and CFTC. Further, firms must also consider the
extent to which the CFTC may affect their remediation efforts in the event they
have violated both the FCPA and the CEA. The costs of FCPA investigation and
remediation efforts are likely to increase with the addition of a third regulator,
which should factor into firms' cost calculus when addressing foreign bribery
allegations.
Conclusion
The CFTC's focus on foreign corrupt practices and their impact on US commodities
and derivatives markets is a new and interesting frontier that will undoubtedly
have meaningful repercussions within the legal and financial markets. Despite
there being a wealth of possibilities for how foreign corrupt practices may run afoul
of the CEA, it is largely unknown how and when the CFTC will apply its authority
to police foreign corruption. As the CFTC brings these cases in the future, it will be
interesting to see how the CFTC extends the extraterritorial reach of its primary
statute and how this affects compliance and internal controls at firms. The markets
ought to pay close attention to the CFTC's actions in this space, given the potential
effects on how business is conducted and sources of liability for firms and
individuals, regardless of whether they are registered with the CFTC. It is also
important, I believe, for scholars to pay attention to this space as well. This is true
not only because of the potential impact on FCPA prosecutions and enforcement
actions, but also because of the slow yet steady confluence of the three primary
actors of financial regulation-the DOJ, SEC, and CFTC-and the continued
extraterritorial expansion of their authority over the markets.
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